Personal Identity and Ethics
The Identity of Indiscernibles (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
First published Tue Dec 20, 2005; substantive revision Fri Oct 11, 2019
What justifies our holding one person over another morally responsible for a past action? Why am I justified in having a special prudential concern for one particular future person over all others? Why do many of us think that maximizing the good within a single life is perfectly acceptable, but maximizing the good across lives is wrong? For these and other normative questions, it looks like any answer we come up with will have to make essential reference to personal identity. So, for instance, it seems we are justified in holding X responsible for some past action only if X is identical to the person who performed that action. Further, it seems I am justified in my special concern for some future person only if he will be me. Finally, many of us think that while maximization within a life affects only one person, a metaphysical unity, maximization across lives affects many different, metaphysically distinct, persons, and so the latter is wrong insofar as it ignores this fundamental separateness of persons.
是什么证明我们让一个人在道德上对过去的行为负责？为什么我有理由对一个特定的未来人而不是其他人有特别谨慎的关心？为什么我们中的许多人认为在单一的生活中最大化善是完全可以接受的，但在整个生活中最大化善是错误的？对于这些和其他规范性问题，看起来我们提出的任何答案都必须对个人身份进行必要的参考。因此，例如，只有当X与执行该行为的人相同时，我们才有理由让X对过去的某些行为负责。此外，似乎我有理由特别关注某个未来的人，只有当他将成为我时。最后，我们中的许多人认为，虽然一个生命中的最大化只影响一个人，但形而上学的统一体，跨生命的最大化影响着许多不同的，形而上学上不同的人，因此后者是错误的，因为它忽视了人的这种根本的分离性。
These are among the many issues relevant to an investigation into the relation between personal identity and ethics. “Ethics” here is broadly construed to be about the way(s) in which we ought to live our lives, and so it includes both self-regarding and other-regarding practical concerns. Among the self-regarding concerns for which personal identity seems relevant are those about the nature and grounds of survival and immortality, rational anticipation, advance directives, and general prudential concern. Among the other-regarding concerns for which personal identity seems relevant are those about the nature and grounds of moral responsibility, compensation, interpersonal moral relations, abortion and embryonic research, population ethics, and therapeutic treatments for dissociative identity disorders. A leading approach to exploring the relation between identity and ethics, then, is to start with an investigation into the nature of personal identity and see how conclusions in that metaphysical realm might apply to these sorts of practical concerns. After starting with a brief discussion of notable historical accounts taking this approach, we will do so as well, surveying the main theories of personal identity on offer and then seeing what, if anything, they might imply for several self-regarding and other-regarding ethical concerns. We will then turn to discuss several new approaches to discovering the relation between personal identity and ethics, alternatives that have breathed fresh life into the debate.
这些是与考察个人身份与道德之间关系有关的许多问题之一。这里的“伦理”被广泛解释为关于我们应该过我们生活的方式，因此它包括自我关注和其他相关的实际问题。在个人身份似乎相关的自我关注中，有关于生存和不朽的性质和理由，理性预期，预先指示和一般审慎关注的问题。个人身份似乎相关的其他问题包括道德责任的性质和理由，补偿，人际关系道德关系，堕胎和胚胎研究，人口伦理以及分离性身份障碍的治疗。因此，探索身份与伦理学之间关系的一个主要方法是从调查个人身份的本质开始，看看形而上学领域的结论如何适用于这些实际问题。在简要讨论采用这种方法的著名历史叙述之后，我们也将这样做，调查所提供的个人身份的主要理论，然后看看它们可能意味着什么，如果有的话，对几个自我关注和其他关于道德的问题。然后，我们将讨论几种发现个人身份与道德之间关系的新方法，这些替代方案为辩论注入了新的活力。
1. Historical Highlights of the Relation1. 关系的历史亮点
2. Contemporary Accounts of Personal Identity
2.5 The Identity Doesn't Matter (IDM) View
2.6 Assessing Theories of Personal Identity in Light of Fission
4. Identity and Normative Ethics
5. Identity and Moral Responsibility
6. Identity and Applied Ethics
6.1 Embryonic Research and Abortion
6.3 Other Issues in Applied Ethics
7. Methodological Alternatives
1. 关系的历史亮点
2. 个人身份的当代叙述
2.1 心理学观点
2.2 生物学观点
2.3 叙事观点
2.4 人类学观点
2.5 身份无关紧要 （IDM） 视图
2.6 根据裂变评估个人身份理论
2.7 非还原主义
2.8 四维主义
3. 审慎和道德单位
4. 身份与规范伦理
5. 身份与道德责任
6. 身份与应用伦理
6.1 胚胎研究和堕胎
6.2 高级指令
6.3 应用伦理学中的其他问题
7. 方法替代方案
8. 结论
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