JP

“The “natural,” pre-experimental, or mythical mind is in fact primarily concerned with meaning—which is essentially implication for action—and not with “objective” nature. The formal object, as conceptualized by modern scientifically oriented consciousness, might appear to those still possessed by the mythic imagination—if they could “see” it at all—as an irrelevant shell, as all that was left after everything intrinsically intriguing had been stripped away.

自然的，“实验主义”产生前的大脑，那些“相信神话”的大脑，它主要的关注是“意义”，为了指导行动，而不是关注“客观的”物质属性。

我们实验主义所关注的有形物质，对于那些被“神话观”笼罩的人来说，是一个无关紧要的外壳，因为我们对有形的描述，在他们看来，是把所有吸引人的东西都被剥去后，剩下的那些东西；而这些客观描述，他们可能根本无法“看到”，无法理解。

For the pre-experimentalist, the thing is most truly the significance of its sensory properties, as they are experienced in subjective experience—in affect, or emotion. And, in truth—in real life—to know what something is still means to know two things about it: its motivational relevance, and the specific nature of its sensory qualities. The two forms of knowing are not identical; furthermore, experience and registration of the former necessarily precedes development of the latter.

对于“前实验主义”的人们来说，事物最真实的意义在于它的感官属性，在于它们在情感或者情绪里主观体验里的呈现。

事实上，在现实生活中，“知道”一件事是什么，意味着“知道”它的两个层面: 它为什么需要被知道，以及它具体的感官属性。

Something must have emotional impact before it will attract enough attention to be explored and mapped in accordance with its sensory properties. Those sensory properties—of prime import to the experimentalist or empiricist—are meaningful only insofar as they serve as cues for determining specific affective relevance or behavioral significance. We need to know what things are not to know what they are but to keep track of what they mean—to understand what they signify for our behavior.

这两个层面的“知道”是不一样的。体验和认知他为什么需要被知道，必然先于它的具体感官属性。

一个事物必须有情感上的影响，才能吸引足够的注意力，吸引我们根据其感官特性进行进一步探索和绘制细节。虽然实验主义者认为一切都是值得被研究的，但是不是所有的感官体验都具有“意义”。

一个感官体验是否有意义，（是否值得我们去研究）取决于它是否能够帮助我们进一步理解某一具体情感或者行为对我们的重要性。 我们去了解事物是什么，最后不是为了知道他们“是”什么具体的东西，而是想搞清楚他们对我们的行为产生什么样的影响。