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翻译-为共同体区块链的辩护

翻译-为共同体区块链的辩护

作者: luckysusan1991 | 来源:发表于2018-01-13 21:34 被阅读86次

这是最近翻译BM的一篇文章,文章中有句话,让我印象深刻:

I feel it is important that people realize that everything in life has design tradeoffs and the secret is to make the best tradeoffs. In order to make the best tradeoffs you must look at the entire picture.

世间万物的存在都是在做权衡的考量,关键在于做出最好的权衡。为了做出最好的权衡必须纵观全局。这句话几乎是整个文章的灵魂。无论是pow,pos,dpos都各有利弊,而每种共同体区块链的也都是在不断的利弊权衡考量中接受市场的检验。

以下是文章翻译,希望对你有用。

In Defense of Consortium Blockchains共同体区块链的辩护

Every so often someone decides towrite an article attacking Delegated Proof of Stake (DPOS) on some basis. Themost resent example is @anonymint's article claiming DPOS can't internet-scale总有人时不时的发文抨击授权股权证明机制,最让气愤的是@anonymint's,声称DPOS不具有网络效应。

Before I go on to addressAnonymint's claims, I feel it is important that people realize that everythingin life has design tradeoffs and the secret is to make the best tradeoffs. Inorder to make the best tradeoffs you must look at the entire picture. Youcannot attack an idea in a vacuum, everything must be compared to somethingelse. Furthermore, if comparisons are to be made they should be againstaccurate descriptions of working alternatives and not against theoreticalalternatives for which there is no known nor proven implementation.在回应Anonymint's之前,我认为有一点很重要:世间万物的存在都是在做权衡的考量,关键在于做出最好的权衡。为了做出最好的权衡必须纵观全局。千万不要凭空攻击某个想法,因为某个东西只有和其他东西比较后,才知道孰优孰劣。即便做比较,也得和已经切实可行的方案对比,而不是和那些没有被实证的理论对比。

Consortium

Blockchains vs Proof of Work共同体区块链vs 工作量证明机制

In his blog, @anonymint claims that"permissioned" blockchains such as Tendermint and DPOS createoverlords. The claim is that overlording "whales" can extract higherand higher rents. This claim cannot exist in a vacuum, but must be compared toalternatives of which Proof of Work is presented. What we know is that FiatWhales control the majority of the hash power and that they hold the networkransom for fees. They use their control over block production to profit at theexpense of everyone else.  Anonymint在博客里讲道,“被授权”的区块链,如Tendermint共识协议和DPOS创建了巨无霸。声称这些“巨无霸”能获得越来越高的回报。可不能就这样凭空职责DPOS,一定要和现存的切实可用的区块链形态,如POW做比较。Fiat Whales因为掌控着大部分的哈希算力,可以收取网络交易费。他们利用对区块链生产的掌控,从其他人那里获取利润。

The claim is that Proof of Work is

"Open Entry"; however, to believe that one must ignore economic barriers to entry. For example, no one can enter the proof of work game unless they can mine profitably. Mining profitably means economies of scale and ultimately alternative revenue streams derived from the political power the miners possess.有人说,POW是可以“自由进入”的;但却忽视了进入门槛。比如,如果挖矿不能获利,那么就没有人能参与POW。挖矿有利可图意味着它会形成具一定经济规模的产业,最终导致政治势力的加入,影响了矿工挖矿。

Many governments in the world cantrivially make mining unprofitable for all free market actors. They can do thiswill relatively little capital cost because all mining profits or losses arebased upon the margins. Since governments are not concerned about directeconomic profit and can realize gains by defending their monopoly, all proof ofwork systems will be dominated by our current fiat overlords who use their fiatprinting presses to subsidize and control cooperative miners.许多国家政府都可以轻而易举地的,用低成本让所有参与自由市场竞争的挖矿者无利可图,因为所有的挖矿利润或挖矿损失都是边际利润。政府不用考虑直接经济利润,只要维护垄断地位就可以获益,因而所有的POW系统都将由“巨无霸”主导,巨无霸奖励了那些愿意合作的矿工的同时也控制了他们。

Furthermore, no minority can create theirown smaller consensus system without risk of abuse by the mining powers thatbe. All one needs to do is look at the mining attacks between BTC and BCH tosee how this unfolds.此外,只要滥用矿力,就会导致共识无法达成。只要看一下BTC和BHC之间的挖矿互击,就知道是怎么回事了。

What we can conclude from this is thatmining is a dead-end, winner takes all, system. Once economies of scaleoptimize a mining algorithm that algorithm cannot be used by any minority whichis at odds with the mining powers.由此,可以得出的结论:挖矿终将是行不通的,最终会导致赢者通吃,一旦一种算法通过规模效应被放大,那他就无法被任何少数派利用,因为这种矿力与少数派的矿力是不相符的。

Liveliness and the 1/3+ attack存活和1/3+攻击

One of the criticisms levied by @anonymint is:colluding malevolent 33% of the stake canpermanently and irreparably shutdown the blockchain@anonymint有一条评论是这样讲的:只要恶意勾结掌握33%的股权,就能永远关闭区块链。

This statement is an example of one ofmany misunderstandings of existing DPOS systems, such as Steem. DPOS as it wasoriginally designed for BitShares uses the longest-chain rule. Because DPOSlimits the frequency a block producer can produce, the chain with the mostparticipation will eventually become the longest chain.这是对现存的DPOS典型的误解,比如Steem。DPOS最初是为BitShares设计,使用的是最长链法则。因为DPOS限制了一个区块生产的频率,因此那条最常用的链最终会成为最长的链。

This means that stake holders can voteout malicious actors even if 51% are malicious, so long as their exists atleast 1 honest producers willing to accurately tally an election on atemporarily minority fork. The "bad fork" will start out at 2/3speed, and the honest fork will be operating at 1/3 speed. Once an electionoccurs on the 1/3 network it will gain speed to 3/3 and eventually overtake the"bad guys".这意味着,即便有51% 的人是恶意的,比特股持有者仍然可以把恶意行为者踢出去,这个链是如此之长,只要有1个诚实的生产者,就能在一条临时分叉出去的区块链上进行投票选举。这条“恶意分叉区块链”以2/3的速度继续运作,诚实的分叉区块链以1/3的速度运作。一旦某个区块链在以1/3的速度完成投票,它将会提速至3/3,最终超过那些“恶意区块链”。

This is still the underlying "ruleof DPOS" on STEEM and BitShares and everything else is simply establishinga high probability of irreversibility.这仍然是STEEM和BitShares的底层“DPOS规则”,其他的仅仅建立了一个最大可能的不可逆过程。

Importance of Minimizing Finality Latency挖矿延迟的重要性

Bitcoin never reaches finality andwithout timely finality inter-blockchain communication is not practical.Imagine all consensus systems as a substitute for digital signatures. Nowimagine if every time a user signed a transaction it took 1 hour for 99.9%certainty (6 blocks) and the transaction was never truly final.比特币永远都不会达到最终状态,但是如果没有及时地进入最终状态,就不能完成区块链内部通信。你可以把所有的共识系统想象成数字签名的替代物。想象,一个用户签一份交易,需要花1小时的时间来(6个区块)99.9%的确认是否交易成功,用这样的速度和确认概率,那么这笔交易就永远不会真正的完成。

At some point society needs to make adecision to either accept the signature and "transfer the money" orreject the signature and not transfer it. If the signature is eventuallyinvalidated then the money shouldn't be transferred; however, if the producthas shipped or the "exchange made", then it isn't possible to fairlyunwind the transfer.有时候,社会需要决定,要么接受签名“转移资金”,要么拒绝签名,不转移资金。如果签名最终是无效的,那么这笔账款就不应该转移;然而,如果交易已经发生了或者“交易已完成”,那么这笔交易记录就不太可能被撤销。

We need to accept things as final even ifthere is some potential they could be wrong or be fraudulent because higherlevel processes cannot advance until lower level processes are final. The costfinality approaches infinity as the certainty demand approaches 100%. At somepoint, the cost of additional certainty is greater than the loss if it turnsout to be fraudulent.即便可能有些潜在的错误,但我们还是得认为交易已经达到了最终状态,因为只有低级的进程实行完成,高级的进程才能发展。如果要达到100%的确认,最终的花费会无限增加。某些程度上,如果最终证明它是错的,那么确定的成本比丢弃它的成本更大。

Because finality is critical forinter-blockchain communication and inter-blockchain communication isfundamental to ultimate internet-scale solutions, we can conclude that statingnothing is ever final is not an acceptable solution. Furthermore, latency infinality dramatically impacts inter-blockchain communication for real worldapplications. If we must have finality, then we should have it as quickly aspossible.由于最终状态对区块链内部通信至关重要,而区块链内部通信对拓展网络规模又至关重要,因此,我们可以得出结论:不能没有最终状态。此外,在真实的应用场景中,潜在最终状态对区块链内部通信影响非常大。如果我们必须得有最终状态,那还是越快越好。

Bitcoin accepts 6 blocks as"final" which means that 5 mining pools vote on which transactionsare final. Even if miners could switch pools in the event that a pool wascorrupt, they are unable to identify the corruption or switch within the 1 hourwindow of finality. This is even without considering the potential corruptionat the hash-power distribution level.比特币以6个区块作为“最终状态”,表明5个矿池来投票选出哪些交易达到“最终”状态。即便矿池中有腐败行为时,矿工可以交换矿池,但无法在1小时的之内分辨出腐败或做出转换。这还没有考虑哈希算力分布级别时潜在的腐败。

If we are going to rely on 5 miningpools, then we might as well let them sign off on things in seconds rather thanwaiting an hour or more. The resulting security will be the same, but thelatency will be dramatically reduced.如果我们继续依靠5个矿池,我们也可以让它们在几秒钟内进行签名,而不是等到一小时后。这两者的安全性时一样的,但是大大降低延迟的概率。

Conclusion结论

 Perfecting any single dimension of a problemwill come at the expense of the whole and reduce overall volume (value). Theoptimum solution will maximize the volume by carefully observing the 80/20rule: 80% of the benefits (value) are achieved by 20% of the effort (cost).Furthermore, no system exists in a vacuum and therefore all security analysisthat ignores the larger environment is incomplete and likely misleading.完善问题的任何一个维度,都会增加成本支出。最好的解决方式是认真权衡二八法则,实现价值最大化:80%的收益由20%的努力决定。并且,没有一个系统是凭空产生的,因此忽视了大环境的安全分析是不完备的,都具有误导性。

Security must always consider the use ofphysical threats, the use of short selling to invert POS incentives, and thepotential for alternative income streams.安全性必须得经常考虑物理性能上的不足,做空POS激励,以及其他收入来源的潜力。

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