12-15期经济学人封面故事-超级富豪如何投资？

世界上最富的0.001%超级富人如何做投资？

超级富人，那些世界上最富有的0.001%人口，都纷纷不露声色密锣紧鼓地组建家族投资事务所管理私人财富，他们正在形成一股暗涌的投资新势力，搅动着国际金融市场。

想起顶尖财富管理生意，人们脑海中会立刻浮现诸如瑞士日内瓦的私人银行，伦敦的Mayfair街区奢华酒店闪闪生辉的大理石地板大堂，以及临建的模仿乡村别墅风格的会客室，这些都是为了让超级富豪客户们有宾至如归的感觉，然后获取生意。现在这些已成为过去式，时髦当下的是暗藏在加州或新加坡上百栋私人玻璃写字楼内的家族投资团队在投资着加拿大的债券，欧洲的不动产，以及中国的初创公司，而他们的金主或许正在某国某区的政治风暴中梦游穿行。

（THINK OF THE upper echelons of the money-management business, and the image that springs to mind is of fusty private banks in Geneva or London’s Mayfair, with marble lobbies and fake country-house meeting-rooms designed to make their super-rich clients feel at home. But that picture is out of date. A more accurate one would feature hundreds of glassy private offices in California and Singapore that invest in Canadian bonds, European property and Chinese startups—and whose gilded patrons are sleepwalking into a political storm.）

越富越有钱的亿万富豪们通过建立自己的私人财富管理团队，挤走之前使用的私人理财中间商；这些团队搜罗全球市场的投资机会，为亿万富豪的财富增值做投资。不知不觉间家族投资办公室已经成为投资界新势力，管理着4万亿美元的资产，超过对冲基金，相当于全球股票市值的6%；而在民粹主义的时代，当家族投资势力越来越强大，势必要面对让他们难以回避的问题比如会让权力更集中，以及加剧不平等这些问题。

（Global finance is being transformed as billionaires get richer and cut out the middlemen by creating their own “family offices”, personal investment firms that roam global markets looking for opportunities. Largely unnoticed, family offices have become a force in investing, with up to $4trn of assets—more than hedge funds and equivalent to 6% of the value of the world’s stock markets. As they grow even bigger in an era of populism, family offices are destined to face uncomfortable questions about how they concentrate power and feed inequality.）

这并不是个全新的概念。早在1882年JD Rockefeller 就建立过家族办公室。但本世纪以来数量激增至，分布在美国、欧洲以及亚洲中心地区如新加坡香港的就有500到1000左右。家族办公室的主要任务是资产管理，但那些数百人的团队，也承担了家族需要的其他任务，比如税务、法务、甚至飞机预定以及安抚宠物诸类高级管家承担的工作。

（The concept is hardly new; John D. Rockefeller set up his family office in 1882. But the number has exploded this century. Somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 are based in America and Europe and in Asian hubs such as Singapore and Hong Kong. Though their main task is to manage financial assets, the biggest offices, some with hundreds of staff, undertake all sorts of other chores, from tax and legal work to acting as high-powered butlers who book jets and pamper pets.）

只有那些财富过亿的家族，在全世界顶尖那0.001%的富人才能负担，把上述专业人士并入家族办公室所需要的成本投入。亚洲大亨们如阿里巴巴的Jack Ma已经建立起他们自己的FO。 由金融大亨与慈善家George Soros建立的西方最大的家族办公室与华尔街的金融公司一样强大，它管理着百亿美元的资产，与银行和私募股权公司竞购公司。

（The costs of bringing such expertise in-mansion means that they generally make sense only for those worth over $100m, the top 0.001% of the global pile. Asian tycoons such as Jack Ma of Alibaba have created their own fiefs. The largest Western family offices, such as the one set up by George Soros, an investor and philanthropist, oversee tens of billions and are as muscular as Wall Street firms, competing with banks and private-equity groups to buy whole companies.）

投资繁荣是由社会孕育的。美国历经40年的中产繁华才在1970年滋生了低调的共同基金，家族办公室的产生反映了剧增的社会不平等。世界顶尖0.01%富豪拥有的财富从1980年的3%增长到现在的8%。家族企业的创造者获得分红或成功IPO后，往往会重新部署调配财富。不过从2008金融危机后外部的财产经理已经丧誉。富人重新审视私人银行高昂的费用以及浑浊不清的提成后，望而却步。

（Every investment boom reflects the society that spawned it. The humble mutual fund came of age in the 1970s after two decades of middle-class prosperity in America. The rise of family offices reflects soaring inequality. Since 1980 the share of the world’s wealth owned by the top 0.01% has risen from 3% to 8%. As the founders of family firms receive dividends or the proceeds of initial public offerings, they usually redeploy the cash. But since the financial crisis there has been a loss of faith in external money managers. Rich clients have taken a closer look at private banks’ high fees and murky incentives, and balked.）

风起不息。亿万富豪数量持续攀升，去年新增199个。那些在1990后创业兴起的老一代企业家随时准备套现，而美国与中国的年青科创企业家很快就会把企业上市，重新释放新一波可投资的财富。随着不可避免的家族办公室在金融系统中的比重继续上升，反对声音相继也会愈演愈烈。最明显而又最难令人信服的反对缘由-家族办公室制造了不平等。其实这是果而不是因。不过，担心也并非空穴来风，其一值得一探。

（These trends are unlikely to fade, as our Briefing explains. The number of billionaires is still growing—199 newbies made the grade last year. In the emerging world older entrepreneurs who created firms in the boom years after 1990 are preparing to cash out, while in America and China younger tech entrepreneurs may soon float their companies, releasing a new wave of cash to reinvest. Family offices’ weight in the financial system, therefore, looks likely to rise further. As it does, the objections to them will rise exponentially. The most obvious of these is the least convincing—that family offices have created inequality. They are a consequence, not its cause. Nonetheless, there are concerns—and one in particular that is worth worrying about.）

一说家族办公室可能会影响金融体系稳定。超富，不透明加上市场，易燃易爆炸。LTCM，一个超富为后盾的千亿级别的对冲基金于1998年爆发，几乎推倒了华尔街。2008众多富豪在Bernie Madoff的庞氏骗局中扑街。然而家族办看起来不像是下一个灾难。他们的负债只有资产的17%，是环球金荣杠杆最低的参与者。相对而言他们更像是稳定剂。他们的资产部署都是几十年计，比银行和对冲基金更少机会面对恐慌。

（The first is that family offices could endanger the stability of the financial system. Combining very rich people, opacity and markets can be explosive. LTCM, a $100bn hedge fund backed by the super-rich, blew up in 1998, almost bringing down Wall Street. Scores of wealthy people fell for a Ponzi scheme run by Bernie Madoff that collapsed in 2008. Still, as things stand family offices do not look like the next disaster waiting to happen. They have debt equivalent to 17% of their assets, making them among the least leveraged participants in global markets. On balance, they may even be a stabilising influence. Their funds are usually deployed for decades, making them far less vulnerable to panics than banks and many hedge funds.）

二说家族办放大了财富对经济的影响。这是有可能的，如果Bill Gates孤注一掷于土耳其，其会独占土股票市场的65%。实际情况则是他们分散风险而非集中，把家族生意赚来的钱放在了不同的篮子。家族办比主流资产管理公司如BlackRock的策略要来得分散。与基金经理相比，家族办更倾向长线和创投。

{The second worry is that family offices could magnify the power of the wealthy over the economy. This is possible: were Bill Gates to invest exclusively in Turkey, he would own 65% of its stockmarket. But the aim is usually to diversify risk, not concentrate power, by taking capital from the original family business and putting it into a widely spread portfolio. The family-office industry is less concentrated than mainstream asset management, which a few firms such as BlackRock dominate. Compared with most fund managers, family offices have welcome habits, including a longer-term horizon and an appetite for startups.）

三说家族办在信息，交易以及税务有独到渠道，令其优先于普通投资者。目前倒是鲜有证据。据调研公司CW报道，家族办平均回报在6%（2016）和16%（2017），略低于于环球股票市场平均。不过大亨多窿路，此言并不假。家族办越来越复杂，三分之一至少有两个分部，逃税更易了。饥饿的经纪和银行铺开红地毯争取这些秘而不宣的公司的合作，许诺普通投资者得不到的条件。如果这确实导致壕深的不公平优势，经年后会导致财富不平灾难性地严重。

（It is the third danger that has most bite: that family offices might have privileged access to information, deals and tax schemes, allowing them to outperform ordinary investors. So far there is little evidence for this. The average family office returned 16% in 2017 and 7% in 2016, according to Campden Wealth, a research firm, slightly lagging behind world stockmarkets. Nonetheless, tycoons are well connected. Family offices are becoming more complex—a third have at least two branches—making tax wheezes easier. Hungry brokers and banks are rolling out the red carpet and pitching deals with unlisted firms that are not available to ordinary investors. If all this did lead to an entrenched, unfair advantage, the effect, when compounded over decades, would make wealth inequality disastrously worse.）

总而言之，要警惕。即使大部分规管者，财务部门，以及税务管理都缺乏与家族办打交道的经验，他们必须保证防止内部交易的管理，交易服务以及税务处理的公平透明化。他们应该促使超过百亿资产的家族办公开账户明细。在充满对特权怀疑的世道，大家族加强透明性其实对他们是有利的。透明化后他们的操作更加不被干扰。 他们甚至可以给资管经理上一课，毕竟他们服务的普通投资者看着月费是多想提走中间商。

(The answer is vigilance and light. Most regulators, treasuries and tax authorities are beginners when it comes to dealing with family offices, but they need to ensure that rules on insider trading, the equal servicing of clients by dealers and parity of tax treatment are observed. And they should prod family offices with assets of over, say, $10bn to publish accounts detailing their workings. In a world that is suspicious of privilege, big family offices have an interest in boosting transparency. In return, they should be free to operate unmolested. They may even have something to teach hordes of flailing asset managers who serve ordinary investors, many of whom may look at their monthly fees and wish that they, too, could ditch the middlemen.）