Beware the bossy state
当心专横的国家
State intervention is being transformed.That won’t make it any more effective
国家干预正在转变。这不会使它更有效
The relationship between governments andbusinesses is always changing. After 1945, many countries sought to rebuildsociety using firms that werestate-owned
and -managed. By the 1980s, faced withsclerosis in the West, the state retreated tobecome anumpire overseeingthe rules for private firms to compete in a global market—a lesson learned, ina fashion, by the communistbloc.Now a new and turbulent phase is under way, as citizens demand action onproblems, from social justice to the climate. In response, governments aredirecting firms to make society safer and fairer, but without controlling theirshares or their boards. Instead of being the owner or umpire, the state hasbecome the backseat driver. This bossy business interventionism iswell-intentioned. But, ultimately, it is a mistake.
政府和企业之间的关系一直在变化。 1945 年后，许多国家试图利用国有和国营的公司来重建社会。到 1980 年代，面对西方的僵化症，国家后撤成为监督私营公司在全球市场竞争规则的裁判——GCZY阵营以某种方式吸取了教训。现在，一个新的动荡阶段正在进行中，因为公民要求对从社会正义到气候等问题采取行动。作为回应，政府正在指导公司让社会更安全、更公平，但不控制他们的股份或董事会。国家不再是所有者或裁判，而是成为后座司机。这种专横的商业干预主义是善意的。然而，归根结底，这是一个错误。
Signs of this approach are everywhere, asour special report explains. President Joe Biden is pursuing an agenda of softprotectionism, industrial subsidies andrighteous regulation, aimed at making the home of free marketssafe for the middle classes. In China X’s “Common Prosperity” crackdown isdesigned to curb the excesses of itsfreewheeling boom, and create a business scene that is moreself-sufficient, tame and obedient. The European Union is drifting away fromfree markets to embrace industrial policy and “strategic autonomy”. As thebiggest economiespivot,so do medium-sized ones such as Britain, India and Mexico. Crucially, in mostdemocracies, the lure of intervention isbipartisan. Few politicians fancy fighting an election on aplatform of open borders and free markets.
正如我们的特别报告所解释的那样，这种做法的迹象无处不在。乔·拜登总统正在推行温和保护主义、工业补贴和公正监管的议程，旨在让自由市场家园对中产阶级变得安全。在中国，X的“共同富裕”打压旨在遏制国内随心所欲的商业扩张，创造一个更加自给自足、温顺和顺从的商业环境。欧盟正在远离自由市场，转而拥抱产业政策和“战略自主权”。随着最大经济体的转型，英国、印度和墨西哥等中等经济体也在转向。至关重要的是，在大多数民主国家，干预的诱惑是两党共识。很少有政客愿意以开放国界和自由市场的立场参加选战。
That is because many citizens fear that marketsand their umpires are not up to the job. The financial crisis and slow recoveryamplified anger aboutinequality. Other concerns are more recent. The world’s ten biggest tech companiesare over twice as big as they were five years ago and sometimes seem to behaveas if they are above the law. The geopoliticalbackdrop isa far cry fromthe 1990s, when the expansion oftrade and democracy promised to go hand in hand, and from the cold war when theWest and the Soviet Union had few business links. Now the West andtotalitarian China arerivals but economicallyintertwined.Gummed-upsupplychains are causing inflation, reinforcing the perception that globalisation isoverextended. And climate change is an ever more pressing threat.
这是因为许多公民担心市场及其裁判不能胜任这项工作。金融危机和缓慢的复苏加剧了人们对不平等的愤怒。其它担忧是最近才出现的。全球十大科技公司的规模是五年前的两倍多，有时它们的行为似乎凌驾于法律之上。地缘政治背景与 1990 年代相去甚远，当时贸易和民主的扩张承诺齐头并进，也与西方和苏联几乎没有商业联系的冷战时期相去甚远。现在西方和极权主义的ZG是竞争对手，但在经济上相互交织。一团糟的供应链正在导致通货膨胀，强化了全球化过度扩张的看法。而气候变化是一个越来越紧迫的威胁。
Governments are redesigning globalcapitalism to deal with these fears. But few politicians or voters want to goback to full scale nationalisation. Not even Mr Xi is keen to reconstruct anempire of iron and steel plants run by chain-smokingcommissars, while Mr Biden, despite hisnostalgia for the 1960s,need only walk through America’sclogged West Coast ports to recall that public ownership can beshambolic. At thesame time the pandemic has seen governments experiment with new policies thatwere unimaginable in December 2019, from perhaps $5trn or more of handouts andguarantees for firms to indicative guidance on optimal spacing of customers inshopping aisles.
各国政府正在重新设计全球资本主义以应对这些担忧。但很少有政客或选民愿意回到全面国有化。就连X先生也不热衷于重建一个由大烟枪政委管理的钢铁帝国，而拜登先生尽管怀念 1960 年代，但只需走过美国拥堵的西海岸港口，就会想起公有制可能是混乱低效的. 与此同时，疫情期间，各国政府尝试了在 2019 年 12 月难以想象的新政策，包括为公司提供可能 5 万亿美元或更多的救济和担保，以及关于购物过道中顾客最佳社交距离的指示性指导。
This opening of the interventionist mind iscoalescing aroundpolicies that fall short of ownership. One set of measures claims to enhancesecurity, broadly defined. The class of industries in which governmentdirection is legitimate on security grounds has expanded beyond defence toinclude energy and technology. In these areas governments are acting asdefacto central planners,with research and development (r&d) spending tofoster indigenous innovation and subsidies toredirect capital spending. In semiconductors America has proposed a $52bnsubsidy scheme, one reason why Intel’s investment is forecast to doublecompared with five years ago. China is seeking self-sufficiency insemiconductors and Europe in batteries.
干预主义思想的这种开放正在围绕缺乏所有权的政策进行整合。一组措施声称可以增强广泛定义的安全性。出于安全原因，政府可以依法指令的行业类别已从国防扩展到能源和技术。在这些领域，政府扮演着事实上的中央计划者的角色，通过研发（R&D）支出来促进本土创新，并通过补贴来重新定向资本支出。在半导体领域，美国提出了一项 520 亿美元的补贴计划，这也是英特尔的投资预计将比五年前翻一番的原因之一。中国正在寻求半导体自给自足，欧洲则是电池。
The definition of what is seen as strategicmay well expand further to include vaccines, medical ingredients and minerals,for example. In the name of security, most big countries have tightened rulesthat screen incoming foreign investment. America’s mesh ofpunitive sanctions andtechnology export controls encompasses thousands of foreign individuals andfirms.
关于战略的定义很可能会进一步扩大，例如把疫苗、医疗配方和矿物质囊括在内。打着安全的旗号，大多数大国都收紧了外国投资的审查制度。美国的惩罚性制裁和技术出口管制网络涵盖了成千上万的外国个人和公司。
The other set of measures aims to enhancestakeholderism. Shareholders and consumers no longer have uncontested primacyin the hierarchy of groups that firms serve. Managers must weigh the welfare ofother constituents more heavily, including staff, suppliers and evencompetitors. The most visible part of this is voluntary, in the form of “esg”investing codes that score firms for, say, protecting biodiversity, localpeople or their own workers. But these wider obligations may become harder forfirms to avoid. In China Alibaba has pledged a $15bn “donation” to the CommonProsperity cause. In the West stakeholderism may be enforced through thebureaucracy. Central banks and public pension funds may shun the securi[1]tiesof firms judged to be anti-social. America’s antitrust agency, which oncesafeguarded consumers alone, ismullingother aims such as helping small firms.
另一套措施旨在加强利益相关者。股东和消费者在公司服务的群体等级中不再具有无可争议的首要地位。管理人员必须更加权衡其他成员的福利，包括员工、供应商甚至竞争对手。其中最明显的部分是自愿的，以“esg”投资代码的形式为公司评分，例如保护生物多样性、当地人民或他们自己的工人。但这些更广泛的义务对公司来说可能变得更难避免。在中国，阿里巴巴已承诺为共同繁荣事业提供 150 亿美元的“捐款”。在西方，利益相关者主义可能通过官僚机构来实施。中央银行和公共养老基金可能会避开被认为是反社会公司的证券。美国的反垄断机构曾经只保护消费者，现在正在考虑其他目标，例如帮助小公司。
The ambition to confront economic andsocial problems is admirable. And so far, outside China at least, bossiergovernment has not hurt business confidence. America‘s main stock[1]marketindex is over 40% higher than it was before the pandemic, while capitalspending by the world’s largest 500-odd listed firms is up by 11%. Yet, in thelonger term, three dangers loom.
直面经济和社会问题的雄心令人钦佩。到目前为止，至少在中国以外，专横的政府并没有损害商业信心。美国主要股市指数比疫情前高出 40% 以上，而全球 500 多家上市公司的资本支出增长了 11%。然而，从长远来看，三个危险迫在眉睫。
High stakes
The first is that the state and business,faced by conflicting aims, will fail to find the best trade-offs. A fossil-fuelfirm obliged to preserve good labour relations and jobs may be reluctant toshrink, hurting the climate. An antitrust policy that helps hundreds ofthousands of small suppliers will hurt tens of millions of consumers who willend up paying higher prices. Boycotting China for its human-rights abuses mightdeprive the West of cheap supplies of solar technologies. Businesses andregulators focused on a single sector are often ill-equipped to cope with thesedilemmas, and lack the democratic legitimacy to do so.
高风险
首先是国家和企业面对相互冲突的目标，将无法找到最佳的权衡取舍。一家有义务保持良好劳资关系和工作岗位的化石燃料公司可能不愿缩减规模，从而损害气候。一项帮助数十万小型供应商的反垄断政策将伤害数以千万计的消费者，他们最终将支付更高的价格。抵制中国侵犯人权可能会剥夺西方廉价太阳能技术的供应。专注于单一行业的企业和监管机构通常没有能力应对这些困境，也缺乏这样做的民主合法性。
Diminishedefficiency and innovation is the second danger.Duplicating global supply chains is extraordinarily expensive: multinationalfirms have $41trn of cross-border investments. More pernicious in the long runis a weakening of competition. Firms that gorge on subsidies becomeflabby, whereas those that areprotected from foreign competition are more likely to treat customersshabbily. If you want torein in Facebook, the most credible challenger is TikTok, from China. Aneconomy in which politicians and big business manage the flow of subsidiesaccording toorthodox thinkingis not one in which entrepreneurs flourish.
效率和创新下降是第二个危险。复制全球供应链非常昂贵：跨国公司拥有 41 万亿美元的跨境投资。从长远来看，更有害的是竞争的削弱。大肆补贴的公司变得松懈，而那些不受外国竞争保护的公司更有可能对客户态度恶劣。如果要控制Facebook，最可信的挑战者是来自中国的TikTok。政治家和大企业按照正统思维管理补贴流动的经济体不是企业家繁荣的经济体。
The last problem iscronyism, which ends up contaminatingbusiness and politics alike. Firms seek advantage by attempting to manipulategovernment: already in America the boundary is blurred, with more corporatemeddling in the electoral process. Meanwhile politicians and officials end upfavouring particular firms, having sunk money and their hopes into them. Theurge to intervene to soften every shock is habit-forming. In the past six weeksBritain, Germany and India have spent $7bnpropping uptwo energy firms and a telecomsoperator whose problems have nothing to do with the pandemic.
最后一个问题是裙带关系，它最终会污染商业和政治。公司通过试图操纵政府来寻求优势：在美国，边界已经模糊，更多的公司干预选举过程。与此同时，政客和官员最终偏爱特定公司，将资金和希望寄托在这些公司身上。干预以减轻每一次冲击的冲动正在形成习惯。在过去的六周里，英国、德国和印度花费了 70 亿美元来支持两家能源公司和一家电信运营商，它们的问题与疫情无关。
This newspaper believes that the stateshould intervene to make markets work better, through, for example, carbontaxes to shift capital towards climate-friendly technologies; r&d to fundscience that firms will not; and a benefits system that protects workers andthe poor. But the new style of bossy government goes far beyond this. Itsadherents hope for prosperity, fairness and security. They are more likely toend up with inefficiency, vested interests andinsularity.
本报认为，国家应该进行干预以使市场更好地运作，例如通过碳税将资本转向气候友好型技术；研发以资助公司不会的科学；以及保护工人和穷人的福利制度。但专制政府的新作风远不止于此。它的追随者希望繁荣、公平和安全。他们更有可能以效率低下、既得利益和孤立而告终。
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