英文早读第113篇，选自巴菲特年度信，友才翻译。
I resurrect this "market-guesting" section only because after the Dow declined from 995 at the peak in February to about 865 in May, I received a few calls from partners suggesting that they thought stocks were going a lot lower. This always raises two questions in my mind :(1) if they knew in February that the Dow was going to 865 in May, why didn't they let me in on it then; and, (2) if they didn't know what was going to happen during the ensuing three months back in February, how do they know in May? There is also a voice or two after any hundred point or so decline suggesting we sell and wait until the future is clearer. Let me again suggest two points :(1) the future has never been clear to me (give us a call when the next few months are obvious to you - or, for that matter the next few hours); and, (2) no one ever seems to call after the market has gone up one hundred points to focus my attention on how unclear everything is, even though the view back in February doesn't look so clear in restrospect.
我重提这个“市场猜测”部分仅仅是因为在道琼斯从2月995的高峰下跌到5月大约865后，我收到了几个来自于合伙人的建议他们认为股市还会走向更低。这经常在我脑海中响起两个问题：（1）如果他们在2月份知道道琼斯在5月将会到865，为什么他们不让我在那之后再进入；和（2）如果他们回溯到2月时不知道在接下来3个月将发生什么，他们又如何在5月知道的？在任何上百个点数如此的下跌后也有一两个声音建议我们卖掉然后等待未来更清晰。让我再一次建议两点：（1）未来对我来说从来不清晰（当接下来几个月对你来说是明显的时候给我个电话——或者，接下来几个小时也可以）；（2）没有人在市场上涨100个点后打电话让我注意一切多么不清晰，即使回头看2月如此不清晰的时候。
If we start deciding, based on guesses or emotions, whether we will or won't participate in a business where we should have some long run edge, we're in trouble. We will not sell our interests in businesses (stocks) when they are attractively priced just because some astrologer thinks the quotations may go lower even though such forecasts are obviously going to be right some of the time. Similarly, we will not buy fully priced securities because "experts" think prices are going higher. Who would think of buying or selling a private business because of someone's guess on the stock market? The availability of a question for your business interest (stock) should always be an asset to be utilized if desired. If it gets silly enough in either direction, you take advantage of it. Its availability should never be turned into a liability whereby its periodic aberrations in turn formulate your judgments. A marvelous articulation of this idea is contained in chapter two (The Investor and Stock Market Fluctuations) of Benjamin Graham's "The Intelligent Investor". In my opinion, this chapter has more investment importance than anything else that has been written.
如果我们开始决定，基于猜测或者情绪，我们是否参与一个我们应该有长期优势的业务，我们将会陷入麻烦。我们不会出售我们在业务（股票）的股份当他们的价格有吸引力而仅仅因为一些算命大师认为市场将会走低尽管这些预测有些时候明显是对的。同样地，我们将也不会购买溢价的股票因为“专家”认为价格会走高。谁会认为买卖一个私人业务会是因为某人在股市的猜测呢？对于你的业务股份（股票）一个问题的可获得性应当是想用的话可以作为一个资产被运用。如果在两个方向上都是愚蠢的，你就利用它。他的可获得性应该永远不能变为一个义务由此他时不时的异常轮流刺激你的判断。一个了不起的表达关于这个主意包含在本杰明格雷厄姆的“聪明投资者”中的第二章（投资者和股市浮动）。在我看来，这一章比其它任何一章所写的都更有投资重要性。
We will have a letter out about November 1 with the Commitment Letter for 1967 and an estimate of the 1966 tax situation.
我们将会在11月1号左右有一封信发出包括1967年承诺函和对1966税务情况的预估。
Cordially,
Warren Buffett
热情地，
沃伦巴菲特
45.ensuing：接下来的；接踵而至的；随后的
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