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本文原文链接为https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1987.tb00752.x ，由本号“EOS技术爱好者”翻译。
The Evolution of a Free Banking System
自由银行体系的演变
coins-1726618_640.jpg
作者：George A.Selgin & Lawrence H.White
翻译：Freya
The development of coins
硬币的发展
In a relatively primitive society in which individuals are just beginning to trade with each other, 'coincidence of wants' problems would arise frequently if market participants were restricted to barter. Some goods would be more in demand than others, however, and at some stage individuals would realize that they had a better chance of getting the goods they wanted if they first accepted some popular intermediate good and then swapped it for the good they wanted to consume. This resort to 'indirect exchange', which employs a certain class (or classes) of intermediate goods, would allow individuals to avoid the 'coincidence of wants' problem, but their transactions costs remain high. In particular, they would still need to measure the quantity of the goods they were offered and assess their quality. They would therefore prefer intermediate goods whose quantity was easily measured and whose quality was relatively uniform. To minimize transport and storage costs, market participants would also want goods that were sufficiently scarce for small amounts to have a high exchange value. Historically, people have tended to converge on the precious metals as desirable intermediate goods and to abandon alternatives as the advantages of precious metals became more apparent.
在一个相对原始的社会中，个人刚刚开始相互交易，如果市场参与者被限制为物物交换，那么“需求一致”的问题就会频繁出现。然而，有些商品的需求量会比其他商品更大，而且在某些阶段，个人会意识到，如果他们首先接受一些流行的中间商品然后把它交换成他们想要的商品，就会有更多的机会得到想要的商品。这种采用某种中间商品的“间接交换”的做法, 会让个人避免“双向需求巧合”的问题，但他们的交易成本仍然很高。特别是仍需要为他们提供的商品数量和质量进行评估。因此，他们更愿意选择数量容易衡量、质量相对统一的中间商品。为了最大限度地降低运输和储存成本，市场参与者还希望商品足够少从而能够换取高的交换价值。从历史上看，人们倾向于将贵金属作为理想的中间商品，而随着贵金属的优势变得更加明显，人们也就放弃了其他替代品。
The use of precious metals as intermediate goods would still leave individuals with the inconvenience of weighing lumps of metal and assessing their purity. This would create an opportunity for some individuals to act as intermediaries and make their living assessing the purity of the metal brought to them and recasting it into pieces of more convenient size. As such practices spread, the fineness and sizes of metal pieces would gradually become standardized, and the private intermediaries would mark the pieces to show their weight and quality. The profits made by the earliest of these intermediaries would attract others, and they would compete with each other for business. It would not take long for them to realize that they could attract more business by using distinctive marks on the metal pieces they issued. The intermediaries would thus become private mints and their metal pieces privately issued coins.
使用贵金属作为中间商品仍然会给个人带来称重金属块和评估其纯度的不便。这将为一些人创造机会，让他们扮演中间人的角色，以评估金属的纯度为生计，并将其重铸成更方便的尺寸。随着这种做法的普及，金属件的细度和尺寸将逐渐标准化，私人中介将对金属件进行标记，以显示其重量和质量。最早的这些中间人所赚取的利润会吸引其他人，他们会互相竞争做生意。然而，他们不久就意识到，他们可以通过在他们发行的每一块金属上使用独特的标记来吸引更多的生意。
Each of these private mints would exist primarily to maximize its own profits, which could be generated in several ways. One would be by offering competitive minting fees. Another would be by developing a reputation for probity to reassure prospective customers that they would not be cheated. A third would be by innocation: mints would experiment with coins of new denominations, alternative metals, and so on. Any successful innovations would be imitated by the other mints and would become widely adopted. It bears stressing that these mints would have no incentive to cheat by overstating the weight of their coins, because such deception would be easy to detect, and this would harm the mint's reputation and hence its business. Furthermore, the law would classify such activity as fraud.
每一种私人铸币厂的存在主要是为了使自己的利润最大化，这种利润可以通过多种方式产生。一种是提供具有竞争力的铸币费用。另一种方法是建立诚信的声誉，让潜在客户相信他们不会被欺骗。第三种方法是无害的:铸币厂将试验新面值的硬币、替代金属等。任何成功的创新都会被其他铸币厂模仿，并将被广泛采用。值得强调的是，这些铸币厂不会通过夸大其硬币的重量来作弊，因为这种欺骗很容易被发现，这会损害铸币厂的声誉，从而影响其业务。此外，法律将此类活动归类为欺诈。
As an aside, it is exactly at this stage that the state historically has intervened in the monetary system. Governments realized they could use their coercive powers to create a legal monopoly that would make the minting business very profitable. Even if the government's service was inferior to that of the private mints, the public could be forced to accept it, as the state would prohibit its subjects from using the coins of other mints. The government could then impose high minting charges or misrepresent the weight of the coins it issued. Note that it is only the state's monopoly over the means of legal coercion that enables the state mint to stay in business. A private mint could not provide an inferior service and survive because it would have no way of compelling people to use its services.
顺便说一句，正是在这个阶段，国家在历史上干预了货币体系。各国政府意识到他们可以利用其强制权力创造一种法律垄断，铸造业务变成业界相互争夺的肥肉。即使政府的服务不如私人铸币厂，公众也可能被迫接受，因为国家将禁止其公民使用其他铸币厂的硬币。然后政府可以施加高额铸币费或谎报其发行的硬币的重量。请注意，只有国家对法律强制手段的垄断才能使国家铸币厂继续经营下去。私人铸币厂不能提供低劣的服务而生存下去，因为它没有办法强迫人们使用其服务。
The development of banks issuing convertible notes
发行可兑换票据的银行的发展
The use of coins would still involve considerable costs, particularly the cost of storage (including the costs of ensuring that one's coins were safe), and the cost of moving coins around. To avoid storage costs, some people would be prepared to pay others who already had the facilities to keep gold safe - those with strongboxes - to store their gold for them. In practice, this would mean that metalsmiths ('goldsmiths') or merchants who regularly kept large amounts of gold or silver would be asked to look after other people's gold for a fee, and they would probably do so, because the marginal cost would be quite low. Depositors would obtain receipts from those holding their gold or silver attesting to the value of each deposit.
使用硬币仍然需要相当大的成本，特别是存储成本（包括确保硬币安全的成本），以及移动硬币的成本。为了避免存储成本，一些人会准备支付给那些已经拥有黄金安全设施的人 - 那些有保险箱的人 – 来为他们存储黄金。在现实中，这意味着金属匠（“金匠”）或经常持有大量黄金或白银的商人会将被要求收取费用来照看其他人的黄金，他们可能会这样做，因为边际成本很低。存款人将从持有黄金或白银的人那里获得收据，以证明每笔存款的价值。
As the practice spread it would increasingly happen that, when two people agreed on an exchange, one would go and withdraw his coins and hand them over to the other, who would deposit them again. Provided that the party accepting payment was satisfied that the goldsmith was likely to honour his commitment, it would be more convenient for him simply to accept the goldsmith's receipt and save both parties the bother of visiting their goldsmiths. Goldsmiths's receipts would this begin to circulate as a medium of exchange in their own right. At the same time, the goldsmiths would begin to notice that only a small proportion of their deposits of gold would be demanded in redemption over any given period, and they would realize that they could lend out some of the gold deposited with them and face little danger of being unable to meet their liabilities. Thus lending activity would give them an opportunity to earn an additional profit.
随着这种做法的推广，越来越多的情况是，当两个人同意交换时，一方会去取出他的硬币并将它们交给另一方，另一方将会把他们存起来。如果接受付款的一方对金匠能够履行其承诺感到满意，那么他更容易接受金匠的收据，并且让双方都不必费心去拜访他们的金匠。金匠的收据将开始作为一种交换媒介而流通。与此同时，金匠们会开始注意到，只有一小部分黄金存款需要在指定时间之内兑换赎回，他们会意识到他们可以借出一些存放在他们这儿的黄金，并且面临无法履行责任的危险。因此，贷款活动将使他们有机会获得额外的利润。
The goldsmiths would thus become bankers and begin to compete with each other for deposits. One way of doing this would be to offer interest on deposits, replacing the earlier fees charged depositors for the safe keeping of their money. More important, the goldsmith-bankers would also compete for deposits by offering guaruntees to prospective depositors that the receipt notes issued by them would retain their value. Perhaps the most persuasive guarantee they could offer would be to make their notes 'convertible', that is, to promise to conver their notes back into specie. The goldsmith-bankers would in fact have offered such promises right from the start, of course, because no one would have placed deposits with them unless they were assured that they could withdraw them. These guaruntees would have the status of legally binding contracts, and the violation of such contract would therefore expose the banker to the legal penalty for default, which we will assume to be sufficiently high to make a banker careful to avoid it.
于是，金匠们变成了银行家并开始为争夺存款而竞争。竞争的一种方法是提供存款利息，以取代先前对存款人收取的存款安全保管费用。更重要的是，金匠银行家们还会通过向潜在存款人提供保证金来争夺存款，他们发出的收据凭证将保存其价值。也许他们能提供的最有说服力的保证就是让他们的凭证“可兑换”，即承诺将他们的凭证兑换成硬币。事实上，金匠银行家从一开始就提供了这样的承诺，因为除非他们确信他们可以提取存款，否则没有人愿意把存款放在他们那儿， 这些保证金具有法律约束力的合同的地位，因此，违反这种合同将使银行家面临违约的法律惩罚，我们将假定这一惩罚足够高，使银行家谨慎小心的避免违约。
This committment to convertibility is one of the most important features of a free banking system, and it has several major implications. First, it would help ensure that banknotes remained relatively stable in value. The value of convertible notes would be tied to the value of gold. It follows that the exchange value of notes against goods in general would fluctuate only with changes in the relative price of gold - that is, the exchange rate between gold and other goods - and we would not normally expect this to be particularly volatile. We might therefore expect the price level to be reasonable stable.
这种对可兑换的承诺是自由银行系统最重要的特征之一，它有几个重要的含义。首先，它将有助于确保纸币的价值保持相对稳定。可兑换票据的价值将与黄金价值挂钩。因此，对商品的票据的交换价值一般只会随着黄金相对价格的变化而波动 - 即黄金与其他商品之间的汇率 - 我们通常不会期望这种情况特别不稳定。因此，我们更期望价格水平合理稳定。
Second, the commitment to the convertibility would provide an effective discipline against goldsmith-bankers who issued an excess of notes. When banks issued convertible notes, their circulation would be limited by the demand to hold them. That demand would depend on such factors as the precise features of the convertibility contract (for example, whether the depositor had to give notice when he wanted to withdraw his deposit), the bank's reputation, the familiarity of its notes, the number of branches it maintained, and so on. Any notes issued beyond the demand to hold them would be returned for redemption. A bank would not deliberately choose to issue an excess of notes, because they would not remain in circulation long enough to justify the expense of putting them into circulation and then taking them back again. If a bank sought to increase its note issue, it might attempt to improve its reputation, advertise its notes more, or open more branches. But it could not increase its note issue simply by putting more notes into circulation. It is one thing to put more notes into circulation, but quite another to keep them there.
其次，对可兑换的承诺将对发行超额票据的金匠银行家提供有效的约束。当银行发行可兑换票据时，它们的流通将受到持有需求的限制。这种需求将取决于可兑换合同的确切特征（例如，存款人在他想要提取存款时是否必须发出通知）、银行的声誉、其票据的熟悉程度、分支机构的数量等因素。发行超出持有需求的任何票据将被退回以进行兑换。银行不会故意发行超额的票据，因为它们在流通中的时间不会长到足以证明将它们投入流通并收回的费用是合理的。如果一家银行试图增加其票据发行，它可能会尝试提高其声誉、更多地宣传其票据，或开设更多分支机构。但它不能仅仅因为希望更多票据流通而增加其票据发行。把更多的票据放到流通中是一回事，但是让它们保持流通又是另一回事。
The development of note-clearing
票据清算的发展
The next stage in the evolution of the banking system would be the development of a note clearing system that would arise out of bankers' attempts to raise their profits by increasing the demand for their notes. In the beginning, no banker would accept the notes of other banks when such notes were submitted by the public because to do so would make rival's notes more acceptable and raise his competitors' profits. But any two banks could make themselves jointly better-off by agreeing to accept each other's notes. Each bank would benefit, because the public would more readily accept the notes of either of the two banks, given the knowledge that the other bank would accept the notes at par as well. The notes of those two banks would thus become slightly more attractive that alternative media of exchange such as gold or the notes of other banks. Thus additional bank pairs would be formed, and it would become increasingly apparent that the easiest way to organize the note exchange system would be to meet regularly at a central clearing session where the banks would hand back each other's notes and settle the differences. In this way a central clearing system would evolve out of the bank's own private self-interest.
银行系统发展的下一个阶段是开发一个票据清算系统，该系统可能是由于银行家试图通过增加对票据的需求来增加利润。一开始，当公众提交此类票据时，没有银行家会接受其他银行的票据，因为这样做会使竞争对手的票据更容易被接受，并提高竞争对手的利润。但任何两家银行都可以通过同意接受彼此的票据来共同改善自己。每家银行都会受益，因为公众会更容易接受两家银行中任何一家的票据，因为他们知道另一家银行也会接受相同价值的票据。因此，这两家银行的票据将比其他交易媒介(如黄金或其他银行的票据)更具吸引力。因此，将形成更多的“银行对“，并且越来越明显的是，组织票据交换系统的最简单方式是在中央清算会议上定期会面，其中银行将退还彼此的票据并解决差异。通过这种方式，中央清算系统将从银行自身的私人利益中发展出来。
The clearing system is important because it would provide a further restrainte on the ability of any one bank to overissue its notes. Without a clearing system a bank that overissued would face a reserve drain only from the general public's returning its notes for specie, and it might take some time for this to force the bank to restrain its issues. Once the clearing system was in operation, however, a bank issuing more notes than the public wanted would also face reserve losses at the central clearing sessions. These losses would occur as the public deposited the extra notes at other banks and those banks returned them to the issuing bank. A bank that over-issued notes would thus lose reserves through two channels - through direct redemption by the public, and through indirect redemption via the clearing system - but the latter channel would be likely to operate more quickly.
清算系统很重要，因为它可以进一步限制任何一家银行滥发票据的能力。如果没有清算系统，过度发行的银行将面临公众将其票据兑换成硬币的储备金的流失，为此，可能需要一段时间去迫使银行限制其发行。然而，一旦清算系统投入运营，银行发行多于公众所需的票据，将也会在中央清算会议上面临储备金损失。这些损失会在公众将超发票据存入其他银行并且这些银行将其退还给发行银行时发生。超发票据的银行因此会通过两个渠道损失储备金-通过公众直接赎回，以及通过清算系统间接赎回——但后一种渠道可能操作起来更加快捷。
The development of a liquidity market
流动性市场的发展
We have seen that the banker's self-interest would lead to note convertibility and to a central clearing system, and both of these would discipline any bank that overissued its notes. They would therefore contribute significantly to the stability of the monetary system. However, if a bank was committed to redeeming all its note liabilities on demand, it would still face a problem of potential illiquidity, given its ability to redeem only a fraction of its liabilities at any given time. With sufficient advance notice a sound bank would be able to meet demands for redemption by liquidating assets, but a problem could arise if it failed to receive the notice it needed. It is this lack of notice that gives rise to the possibility that an otherwise sound bank might become illiquid and unable to honour its obligations.
我们已经看到，银行家的自身利益将使得票据具有可兑换性以及产生中央清算系统，并且这两者都会对任何过度发行票据的银行进行约束。因此，它们将对货币体系的稳定性作出重大贡献。但是，如果一家银行承诺按需赎回所有票据债务，它仍将面临潜在的流动性不足的问题，因为它在任何指定时间内只能赎回其债务的一小部分。如果预留了足够时间提前通知，一家稳健的银行将能够通过清算资产来满足赎回要求，但如果未能收到所需的通知，就可能会出现问题。正是由于缺乏通知，才有可能使一家本来健全的银行变得缺乏流动性，无法履行其义务。
Two institutions would develop to deal with the problem. The first would be the growth of a market in short-term liquidity. This would arise because bankers' holdings of liquidity would be subject to random short-term fluctuations that were difficult to predict accurately. At any given time some banks would find themselves with more liquidity than they had anticipated and others with less. Those with 'excess' reserves would be willing to lend them out on a short-term basis, while those that were short of reserves would be willing to borrow them, making both groups better-off. Experience would teach the lending banks what kind of collateral policy to adopt, what information they needed from prospective borrowers, and so on.
两个体系将会发展来处理这个问题。首先是短期流动性市场的增长。之所以会出现这种情况，是因为银行家持有的流动性会受到难以准确预测的随机短期波动的影响。在任何时候，一些银行会发现自己的流动性高于预期，而另一些银行的流动性低于预期。那些拥有“超额”准备金的人会愿意在短期内将它们的准备金借出，而那些缺乏准备金的人会愿意借它们，这让这两个群体都变得更富有。这些经验将教会贷款银行应采用何种抵押政策，他们需要从潜在借款人那里获得哪些信息等。
The development of option clauses
期权条款的发展
However, a bank could borrow only if others were ready to lend to it. This is an important qualification, because it means that the banking system as a whole might not be able to obtain the reserves needed from the liquidity market, even though any individual bank could. This constraint could pose a problem if an unexpectedly high demand for cash caused the short-term liquidity market to dry up temporarily as everyone demanded more reserves and no one was willing to supply them. In principle, this could cause the banking system to collapse. Since the danger is caused by the banks' committment to redeem their notes on demand without notice, the banks might try to avoid it by modifying the convertibility contract on their notes. Instead of guarunteeing to redeem their notes for specie on demand, the banks could reserve the right to defer redemption for some pre-specified period on the condition that noteholders would be paid pre-specified compensation when the notes were finally redeemed. In other words, the bankers could insert clauses into the convertibility contract that would give them the option of deferring redemption.
但是，银行只有在其他人准备贷款的情况下才能借款。这是一项重要的限制，因为这意味着整个银行系统可能无法从流动性市场获得所需的储备金，即使任何一家银行都可以。如果对现金的意外的高需求导致短期流动性市场暂时干涸，这种限制可能会带来问题,因为每个人都需要更多的储备金并且没有人愿意提供这些储备金。原则上，这可能导致银行系统崩溃。由于风险是因银行在没有通知的情况下承诺按要求赎回票据产生的，银行可能会试图通过修改票据上的可兑换合同来避免它。与保证按要求兑换他们的票据不同的是，银行可以保留在某些预先规定的期限内推迟赎回的权利，条件是在票据最终被赎回时，票据持有人将获得预先规定的补偿。换句话说，银行家可以在可兑换合约中加入条款，让他们可以选择推迟兑换。
These 'option clauses' would need to be carefully designed. To remain in business, a bank that introduced option clauses would need to reassure the public that its notes were still safe. It would want to make a credible promise that it would use the option only in exceptional circumstances and that noteholders would suffer no losses even then. To be convincing the bank would need to set the compensation paid to noteholders at a level high enough for it never to be in the bank's interest to exercise the option except in an emergency. The bank might also stress the advantages of the option clause to the risk-averse noteholder. Those noteholders slow to react to a run on specie would lose little or nothing by their failure to be first in line, and indeed would gain from the compensation the bank would have to pay for suspending convertibility. And even if the bank should turn out to be insolvent as well as illiquid, then losses would be shared on a pro rata basis among noteholders and other creditors rather than falling disproportionately on those who were not quick enough to demand redemption before the bank suspended. It would thus be clear to the public that the bank would have recourse to the option only as a last resort, and that the option, if anything, would probably make individuals better off.
这些“期权条款”需要仔细设计。为了保证业务，引入期权条款的银行需要向公众保证其票据仍然是安全的。它需要作出一个可靠的承诺，即它只会在特殊情况下使用该期权，并且即使在这种情况下票据持有人也不会遭受任何损失。有理由相信,银行需要将支付给票据持有人的补偿金设定在足够高的水平，以确保除非在紧急情况下，银行永远不会有兴趣行使期权。银行也可能会向风险厌恶型的票据持有人强调期权条款的优势。那些不愿对货币挤兑做出反应的票据持有者，如果不能成为第一批发行票据的票据持有者，他们的损失将微乎其微，甚至没有任何损失,而且确实会从银行因暂停兑换而必须支付的赔偿金中获益。即使这家银行被证明是资不抵债且流动性不佳的，损失也将按比例在票据持有人和其他债权人之间分担，而不是不成比例地落在那些在银行被暂停之前没有足够迅速地要求赎回的人身上。因此，公众将清楚地认识到，银行只能作为最后手段使用该期权，而且如果有的话，该期权可能会使个人变得更富有。
Trial and error in the market place would determine the period over which redemption could be deferred and the interest to be paid on notes whose redemption had been suspended. The exact form of option clause is therefore difficult to predict beforehand. The compensatory interest rate would presumably be linked to the interest rate of the short-term liquidity market. A plausible formula would be 'x points above the average rate prevailing in the short-term market over the past y months'. With such a formula, the option would never be exercised in 'normal' times because a bank could always obtain liquidity more cheaply in the short-term market. If a liquidity crisis were to develop, however, the short-term interest rate would rise sharply, and once it rose beyond a certain threshold level it would be cheaper for the bank to obtain - or, strictly speaking, to retain - liquidity by invoking its option of deferring payment. For simplicity we assume that all banks face the same threshold level, leading all banks to invoke their options simultaneously.
市场上的反复试错将决定赎回可以延期的期限以及赎回已被暂停的票据的利息。因此，期权条款的确切形式很难事先预测。补偿利率可能与短期流动性市场的利率挂钩。一个看似合理的公式是”比过去y个月的短期市场平均利率高出x点”。有了这样一个公式，在“正常”时期，银行永远不会行使期权，因为在短期市场，银行总是可以以更低的成本获得流动性。然而，如果出现流动性危机，短期利率将急剧上升，一旦超过一定的阀值水平，银行通过推迟支付来获得(或严格地说，保持)流动性的成本就会更低。为简单起见，我们假设所有银行都面临相同的阀值水平，导致所有银行同时启用其期权。
This would set in motion a chain of events that would break the crisis, send interest rates downward again and alleviate the shortage of liquidity. In the period immediately after the banks started to exercise their options, market interest rates would remain above the penalty rates the banks were paying through the use of their options, making it worthwhile for banks to borrow by invoking their options and to lend on the short-term liquidity market. The banks would thereby channel liquidity to where the demand for it was greatest, thus beginning to alleviate the shortage of liquidity and causing market interest rates to begin to fall. The banks would continue these arbitrage activities until the market interest rate had come down to the penalty level. Once it reached that level the banks would no longer derive any benefit from exercising their option to defer redemption, and they would be ready to resume redemption on demand. By the time interest rates had fallen to that level, the public's panic over liquidity would have abated. As the demand for liquidity continued to fall interest rates would return to pre-panic levels. The introduction of option clauses would thus protect the liquidity of the banking system and break the panic. The knowledge of this would itself make the banking system considerably more stable by eliminating the possibility of a bank run starting because of the public's self-fulfilling expectations of a run.
这将引发一系列事件，这些事件将打破危机，再次压低利率，缓解流动性短缺。在银行开始行使期权之后的一段时期内，市场利率将持续高于银行通过行使期权支付的罚款率，这使得银行通过行使期权进行借贷和在短期流动性市场放贷是值得的。因此，银行将流动性引导至需求最大的地方，从而有助于缓解流动性短缺并导致市场利率开始下降。银行将继续这些套利活动，直到市场利率降至罚款水平。一旦达到该水平，银行将不再从推迟赎回中获得任何利益，并且他们将准备按需求恢复赎回。当利率下降到这个水平时，公众对流动性的恐慌将会减弱。随着流动性需求持续下降，利率将回到恐慌前的水平。因此，期权条款的引入将保护银行体系的流动性并打破恐慌。由于公众对银行挤兑的自我实现预期消除了银行挤兑的可能性,这一点将会使银行体系更加稳定。
This completes our discussion of the evolution of a laissez-faire banking system. Note, in particular, how institutions like convertibility, a clearing system, a market for short-term liquidity and option clauses would develop and protect the banking system against shocks. The sole driving force behind these stabilizing mechanisms would be individuals' self-interested attempts to protect themselves against adverse conditions. A free market monetary system would thus be highly stable.
至此，我们结束了对自由银行体系演变的讨论。特别要注意的是，可兑换性、清算系统、短期流动性市场和期权条款等体系将如何发展和保护银行系统免受冲击。这些稳定机制背后的唯一推动力是个人自我利益免受不利条件侵害的动机。因此，自由市场货币体系将非常稳定。
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