作者：Geoffrey A. Moore
出版社：HarperBusiness
副标题：Marketing and Selling Disruptive Products to Mainstream Customer
发行时间：2014年1月28日 3rd edition, 1991年11月 First published
来源：下载的 azw 版本
Goodreads：3.98（17194 Ratings）
豆瓣：8.4（392 人评价）
概要
本书所说的「跨越鸿沟」是指产品从早期用户到主流用户的爆发点的「跨越」：
To be specific, the point of greatest peril in the development of a high-tech market lies in making the transition from an early market dominated by a few visionary customers to a mainstream market dominated by a large block of customers who are predominantly pragmatists in orientation. The gap between these two markets, all too frequently ignored, is in fact so significant as to warrant being called a chasm, and crossing this chasm must be the primary focus of any long-term high-tech marketing plan. A successful crossing is how high-tech fortunes are made; failure in the attempt is how they are lost.
本书最早的版本，到现在已经有27年了，在那个时候就预见到了科技产品的「发展鸿沟」可谓有先见之明，Geoffrey Moore 所构建的理论早已是商学院的基础课程，为无数的科技产品提供市场扩张时的借鉴
作者介绍
Geoffrey Moore (born 1946) is an American organizational theorist, management consultant and author. Moore received a bachelor's degree in American literature from Stanford University (1967) and a doctorate in English literature from the University of Washington (1974).
作者撰写此书以后围绕着「跨越鸿沟」的概念组建了咨询公司，感觉是产学结合的优秀代表
读后感
知道这本书是看到乔布斯推荐了 Geoffrey Moore 的第二本书《Inside the Tornado》，在看的时候发现作者不断的引用这本书的内容，所以索性也翻了一下，我相信任何在27年读懂这本书的人，现在都已经是市场上的佼佼者，知识永远是第一生产力
摘录
To be specific, the point of greatest peril in the development of a high-tech market lies in making the transition from an early market dominated by a few visionary customers to a mainstream market dominated by a large block of customers who are predominantly pragmatists in orientation. The gap between these two markets, all too frequently ignored, is in fact so significant as to warrant being called a chasm, and crossing this chasm must be the primary focus of any long-term high-tech marketing plan. A successful crossing is how high-tech fortunes are made; failure in the attempt is how they are lost.
When this book was originally drafted in 1989, I drew on the example of an electric car as a disruptive innovation that had yet to cross the chasm. Indeed at that time there were only a few technology enthusiasts retrofitting cars with alternative power supplies. When I revised it extensively in 1999, once again I drew on the same example. GM had just released an electric vehicle, and all the other manufacturers were making noise. But the market yawned instead. Now it is 2013, and once again we are talking about the market for electric vehicles. This time the vendor in the spotlight is Tesla, and the vehicle getting the most attention is their Model S sedan.
Innovators pursue new technology products aggressively. They sometimes seek them out even before a formal marketing program has been launched. This is because technology is a central interest in their life, regardless of what function it is performing. At root they are intrigued with any fundamental advance and often make a technology purchase simply for the pleasure of exploring the new device’s properties. There are not very many innovators in any given market segment, but winning them over at the outset of a marketing campaign is important nonetheless, because their endorsement reassures the other players in the marketplace that the product could in fact work.
Early adopters, like innovators, buy into new product concepts very early in their life cycle, but unlike innovators, they are not technologists. Rather they are people who find it easy to imagine, understand, and appreciate the benefits of a new technology, and to relate these potential benefits to their other concerns. Whenever they find a strong match, early adopters are willing to base their buying decisions upon it. Because early adopters do not rely on well-established references in making these buying decisions, preferring instead to rely on their own intuition and vision, they are core to opening up any high-tech market segment.
The early majority share some of the early adopter’s ability to relate to technology, but ultimately they are driven by a strong sense of practicality. They know that many of these newfangled inventions end up as passing fads, so they are content to wait and see how other people are making out before they buy in themselves. They want to see well-established references before investing substantially. Because there are so many people in this segment—roughly one-third of the whole adoption life cycle—winning their business is fundamental to any substantial profits and growth.
The late majority shares all the concerns of the early majority, plus one major additional one: Whereas people in the early majority are comfortable with their ability to handle a technology product, should they finally decide to purchase it, members of the late majority are not. As a result, they wait until something has become an established standard, and even then they want to see lots of support and tend to buy, therefore, from large, well-established companies. Like the early majority, this group comprises about one-third of the total buying population in any given segment. Courting its favor is highly profitable indeed, for while profit margins decrease as the products mature, so do the selling costs, and virtually all the R&D costs have been amortized.
Finally there are the laggards. These people simply don’t want anything to do with new technology, for any of a variety of reasons, some personal and some economic. The only time they ever buy a technological product is when it is buried deep inside another product—the way, say, that a microprocessor is designed into the braking system of a new car—such that they don’t even know it is there. From a market development perspective laggards are generally regarded as not worth pursuing on any other basis.
The First Crack
Two of the gaps in the High-Tech Marketing Model are relatively minor—what one might call “cracks in the bell curve”—yet even here unwary ventures have slipped and fallen. The first is between the innovators and the early adopters. It is a gap that occurs when a hot technology product cannot be readily translated into a major new benefit—something like Esperanto. The enthusiast loves it for its architecture, but nobody else can even figure out how to start using it.
The Other Crack
There is another crack in the bell curve, of approximately equal magnitude, that falls between the early majority and the late majority. By this point in the Technology Adoption Life Cycle, the market is already well developed, and the technology product has been absorbed into the mainstream. The key issue now—transitioning from the early to the late majority—has to do with lingering residual demands on the end user to be technologically competent.
Segways are a classic example of this phenomenon. You’ve seen them on occasion in malls or in airports, looking something like an old-fashioned lawn mower gone vertical, ridden around by someone in a security professional’s uniform. Kind of dorky looking, but don’t kid yourself. The gyroscopic balance control is fabulous, and the control movements once mastered are graceful. The hope was these devices would become a universal transport mechanism. Why didn’t that happen? In a word: stairs. Stairs are pesky little devils that crop up everywhere, and Segways do not handle them well at all. That’s what we call a showstopper. So while Steve Wozniak can still field a brace of Segways for a rousing match of polo, no one has yet come up with a breakthrough application for the rest of us. Hence its fate for any foreseeable future is to dwell in the chasm forever.
As expensive a lesson as the Segway was for its investors, it pales by comparison with the reputed $6 billion bath Motorola took on its satellite mobile phone venture Iridium. Again, from a technology enthusiast’s point of view, what a great idea! Instead of building out tens of thousands of cellular base stations everywhere—and still failing to adequately cover sparsely populated areas—how about putting up seventy-seven low-earth-orbiting satellites and do the job for the entire planet? (FYI, seventy-seven happens to be the atomic number for iridium, which is a technology enthusiast’s idea of a cool inside joke.) So what happened? Well, in this case it was not stairs that were the problem, it was buildings! Satellite communications do not work very well inside buildings. Add to that the bulkiness of the handsets compared to cellular mobile phones, plus the very high cost of subscribing, and once again you have a showstopper. Today the technology is indeed used successfully for niche applications, but to put that in perspective, the network was bought out of bankruptcy for $25 million. Chasms can result in very painful falls indeed.
单词列表:
| words | sentence |
|---|---|
| bowling alley | the chasm, and the bowling alley, on to the tornado |
| siren lure | it still holds out the siren lure of a legitimate get-rich-quick opportunity |
| outmanufactured | we may see ourselves being outmanufactured, but not outmarketed |
| in sum | In sum, technology enthusiasts are easy to do business with |
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